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SUMMARY. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the precariousness of federal public health institutions in
the United States, and how disastrously things can go when those institutions are undermined by political
forces. Such institutions can be disbanded, underfunded, populated with incompetent political hacks,
manipulated, or sidelined. As a field, public health in particular needs some political space, given that it
requires deep scientific expertise and needs to communicate to the public clearly, reliably, and with authority
to engender trust. Key public health agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in particular, should be buttressed against future political encroachment, using legal mechanisms from
administrative law, which are tried and true in other domains of governance. Models include the Federal
Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) (created in 1933), the Federal Reserve System (1913), the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) (1914), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (1935). Key features of these
agencies include having multi-member boards of qualified experts to lead them, enjoying independence from
the president (not able to be fired without cause), and having statutory budgetary authority by not requiring
congressional appropriation or allowing executive reallocation. We discuss the ways in which independence
can increase deference accorded by the courts, as well as the risk that it may reduce political accountability.

Introduction
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We have three overarching concerns with the institutionalization
of public health leadership and policy in the United States. The
first is whether federal institutions are competent to make sound
decisions and implement them reliably, with appropriate deference
from the White House, Congress, and the judiciary. Second, is
whether the American people trust those institutions that they rely
on for key guidance in regulating their own behavior. Third, is for
the optimal vertical distribution of authority between the states
and federal government (Wiley, 2020).
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The Need for Stable Competence
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In 2018, President Trump disbanded a national pandemic response
team that had been created after the 2014 Ebola epidemic. As
a result, no senior leader in the U.S. government was focused
on global health preparedness. The Trump administration and
the preceding Obama administration also failed to replenish the
national stockpile of personal protective equipment (PPE), such
that even a year after the pandemic began, shortages remained.
The lack of systematic public health surveillance has caused
academic and media organizations to try to cobble together their

own databases from local sources. These failures suggest a lack of
stable and competent administration, in part due to short-sighted
political interference.
The Need for Public Trust
The politicization of the pandemic has also undermined the
American public’s trust in its own institutions, which is reflected
in the lack of consensus about simple health precautions, such
as mask wearing, and about whether the new vaccines are safe
and effective. An independent federal public health agency would
help communicate information to the public about the vaccines
and other countermeasures and thereby help regain the trust of
the public. One cannot blame the public for being confused and
doubtful. They saw the Trump administration’s surgeon general
reverse his guidance as to masks, and saw the FDA first issuing and
then reversing its emergency authorization for President Trump’s
pet drug (hydroxychloroquine), recognizing the lack of efficacy
and cardiac safety concerns. Likewise, Americans saw the FDA
commissioner publicly apologize after inflating the benefits of
blood plasma in a White House press conference on the eve of the
Republican National Convention.
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The scope of this independent public health agency (or agencies)
is subject to debate. One could imagine a complete overhaul
of the FDA, the CDC, and a range of other agencies that impact
public health, not just in the times of pandemic but more generally
(Weinstein et al., 2021). A more modest reform would focus on
ensuring that the public and policymakers have curated, reliable
public health information and formal guidance, free of political bias
(Salwa & Robertson, 2021). The key role would be one of synthesis,
whether compiling local public health surveillance data or
synthesizing scientific research about the efficacy of therapeutics,
beyond the FDA’s binary decision about whether to license the
product.

The Need for a Federal Power
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Of course, political manipulation of public health institutions was
not invented just for the COVID-19 pandemic; it is rather endemic to
the field (Bennett & DiLorenzo, 2000). In 2007, a bipartisan group
of former surgeons general testified before Congress that, “the
nation’s doctor has been marginalized and relegated to a position
with no independent budget and with supervisors who are political
appointees with partisan agendas” (Rovner, 2007). In 2017, officials
from the Department of Health and Human Services instructed
the staff of the CDC to not use seven words in its upcoming budget
appropriation request: diversity, transgender, vulnerable, fetus,
entitlement, evidence-based, and science-based (Gostin, 2018).
Some have even argued that because public health is inherently
political, such politicization is not a reason for concern (Goldberg,
2012). We believe that this concern is best addressed through
careful institutional design, with a balance of political interests and
scientific expertise, as we outline below.

We believe that Congress and President Biden should create an
independent public health agency that will insulate experts from
partisan games and the whims of self-serving individuals. The
agency should, moreover, engender public trust and consolidate
sufficient federal power and information in order to create
guidance and manage public health crises.
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In contrast, one consistent and trusted voice in all this chaos was
Dr. Anthony Fauci. Even when temporarily sidelined by the Trump
administration, as a career civil servant in the National Institutes of
Health, Dr. Fauci was somewhat protected from being unilaterally
fired by the president. That protection gave him the latitude to
speak the truth and communicate the best available science, and it
gave the public reason to trust him.

Traditionally, public health has been conceived as primarily a
state responsibility that states fulfill by exercising their plenary
police powers. However, Congress has already recognized that
the profound effects on interstate commerce created by a public
health emergency may require the exercise of broad federal powers
as well. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 264 provides that the surgeon
general and secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services are “authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in
his judgment are necessary to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases … from one State or possession into any other State or
possession.” So the potential role of the federal government in a
public health crisis is broad, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s
concern in 2012 in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius to “read carefully” the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause “to avoid creating a general federal authority akin
to the [states’] police power.”
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In a remarkable inversion of foxes and henhouses, in September
2020 the leaders of nine pharmaceutical companies found it
necessary to make a public pledge to “stand with science” (Thomas,
2020). In December 2020, President Trump threatened to fire the
politically-appointed FDA Commissioner just as the agency was
in final steps of issuing an Emergency Use Authorization for a
COVID-19 vaccine, leaving some to wonder whether the agency’s
decision would be driven by science. That same month, the
editor-in-chief of the CDC’s weekly Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report revealed that political appointees were interfering with the
publication, and had instructed her to delete emails proving as
much (Weiland et al., 2020).

Models for the Independent Agencies

As Lindsay Wiley argued in Volume I of the Policy Playbook,
“federal-state conflicts have stymied efforts to ramp up and
coordinate” the COVID-19 response (Wiley, 2020). Last year, for
example, President Trump blamed states for the failure to reach
his stated goal of distributing 20 million vaccines by the end of
2020, notwithstanding the federal government’s planning for such
a need (Armstrong et al., 2020). Although state governments may
be more politically accountable than federal actors, and have more
granular local information and relationships, they lack the scale,
infrastructure, expertise, power to compel production, and power
to issue money and spend deficits, which are essential during a
time of pandemic.

The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) presents one model for
public health governance. The motivating problem of politicization
is analogous: Congress recognized that if presidents could pump
money into the U.S. economy whenever an election was coming,
the economy could overheat and crash. To prevent such boom
and bust cycles, Congress created the Fed, whose governors
serve for 14-year terms. Bringing economic expertise, they can
focus on market fundamentals, rather than the changing winds
of politics. Not unlike his fierce attacks on other institutions,
President Trump also pressured the Fed to boost the economy,
but it largely withstood the pressure, due to its institutional
features. Nonetheless, partisan political influences have crept
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Our primary focus is to protect public health agencies from
horizontal threats from politicized federal actors in the White
House, Congress, or the courts. However, this is also an opportunity
to redistribute authority vertically, as between the federal and state
governments.

Regardless of the specific scope and mission of the independent
public health agency, there are important precedents and models.
The United States has dozens of independent agencies, from the
Postal Regulatory Commission to the National Labor Relations
Board — but virtually nothing for public health. Table 9.1 shows the
design features of eight key independent agencies, out of about 100
in the federal system.

COVID-19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE • MARCH 2021 • WWW.COVID19POLICYPLAYBOOK.ORG • 65

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3844058

CHAPTER 9 • THE NEED FOR A STRONG AND STABLE FEDERAL PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCY INDEPENDENT FROM POLITICIANS

Table 9.1. Examples of Independent Federal Agencies. This table is adapted and expanded from Salwa and Robertson (2021).

MANDATE & ROLE

MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA

Federal Trade
Commission
(FTC) (1934)

To protect net neutrality and broadband privacy;
regulates communications by radio, television, wire,
satellite, and cable.

• 5 commissioners
• 5 year terms
• only 3 can be members of the same political party
• none can have financial interest in FCC related business

Federal Deposit
Insurance Commission
(FDIC) (1933)

Provides deposit insurance to depositors in U.S.
commercial and savings banks. In 2010, a new division,
the Office of Complex Financial Institutions, was
created to focus on assessment of risk in the largest,
systemically important financial institutions.

• 5 commissioners
• 6 year terms
• only 3 can be members of the same political party
• 1 member needs to have State bank supervisory
experience

Federal Reserve
System
(The Fed) (1913)

Sets interest rates, and regulates banks. Also
authorizes broad-based programs and financial
assistance to individual institutions to stabilize
financial markets.

• 7 members
• 14 year terms
• for cause removal

Federal Trade
Commission
(FTC) (1914)

Investigates fraud, identity theft, false advertising,
and anticompetitive business practices. In 2013 it set
standards for environmental marketing. It has also
been active in the review of hospital mergers, with
some notable successes in blocking or unwinding
consolidations.

• 5 commissioners
• 7 year terms
• only 3 can be members of the same political party
• none can have financial interest in FCC-related business

National Labor
Relations Board
(NLRB) (1935)

Enforces labor law in relation to collective bargaining
and unfair labor practices. It supervises elections
for union representation and can investigate and
remedy unfair labor practices. Unfair labor practices
may involve union-related situations or instances of
protected concerted activity.

• 5 board members
• 5 year terms

Securities and
Exchange Commission
(SEC) (1934)

Enforces federal securities laws, as well as proposes
securities rules, and regulates the securities industry.

• 5 commissioners
• appointed by POTUS
• advice and consent of the Senate
• 5 year terms
• only 3 can be members of the same political party
• try to alternate which party appointees are from
wherever practicable

Federal Election
Commission
(FEC) (1975)

Enforces federal election law and campaign finance
laws. Due to lack of a quorum the commission has not
functioned since July 2020.
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AGENCY
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Surface Transportation
Board
(STB) (1996)

Regulates primarily freight rail and other modes of
surface transportation.

• 8 commissioners
• 6 appointed by POTUS
• advice and consent of the Senate
• 2 more commissioners: the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives or their
designees
• 6 year terms
• only 3 can be members of the same political party
• the 6 members POTUS chooses must be chosen because
of integrity and good judgement
• 5 full time members
• advice and consent of the Senate
• POTUS appointed
• 2 term limits
• 5 year term
• At least 3 members of the Board shall be individuals with
professional standing and demonstrated knowledge
• 2 members shall be individuals with professional or
business experience
• 2 term limit
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Executive Protection
To avoid undue political influence, agency leaders cannot be
simply fired and replaced at will, as President Trump repeatedly
threatened to do. Yet, there are constitutional limits to how
Congress can create such protection. In 1935 in Humphrey’s
Executor, the Supreme Court distinguished quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative bodies, either of which could be given strong
protections against political interference from the executive
branch, from quasi-executive bodies, which cannot be completely
insulated from politics. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has not
found issue with the statutorily mandated removal criterion of
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” to give
protection beyond the normal “at will” standard for firing a political
appointee.

tn

ot

In its 1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court found
that because the Federal Elections Commission performs
executive functions, its members must be nominated and
confirmed by the Senate, as per the procedures in Article II of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court now requires that if an agency
is to be independent, it must be led by a commission of multiple
experts. In its 2020 decision of Selia Law v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Supreme Court held that having a
single independent director was unconstitutional. Table 9.1 shows
that agencies are often governed by five or more commissioners,
and that the executive board is subject to the Senate’s advice and
consent.
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Expertise
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The governing statute can specify that officers are to be appointed
based on their experience, as was the case in Humphrey's Executor.
This standard has so far struck a decent balance, without
unconstitutionally restricting the president’s executive power.
Accordingly, the law should require that the commissioners have
relevant expertise, including advanced degrees in the relevant
disciplines.
Partisanship

Expert leadership is not enough. Trust in experts has itself
become a subject of partisan dispute, reflecting both a general
populist cynicism about know-it-all elites and motivated reasoning
about whether any particular expert opinion aligns with political
preferences (a phenomenon known as “solution aversion”)
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Budget

Another key feature of agency independence is financial. If
either Congress or the White House can threaten to, or actually,
eviscerate an agency budget, the agency may succumb to political
pressures. An independent public health agency might be created
with dedicated tax revenues related to public health, including
new taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, legalized marijuana, or low-value
health care. Marijuana may present the greatest opportunity,
as it presently not taxed by the federal government. Federal
legalization could dramatically drive down prices, which would
create a substantial opportunity to raise tax revenues, which could
then be put into a public health trust fund (Gravelle & Lowry, 2014).
Analogously, the FDA already receives some of its money from fees.
Judicial Deference

Beyond independence from the political branches, an effective
public health agency also needs to receive deference from the
courts. Yet, during the pandemic, courts struck down several public
health measures.
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Multiple Confirmed Commissioners
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There are several key aspects of independent agency design.
These include protections for executives, the composition of
the executives, budgetary authority, and deference from other
government actors.
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Design Features

(Campbell & Kay, 2014). There is some value in having the members
reflect the democratic will of the people and both political parties,
so we propose that the independent agency’s board be balanced
and staggered so that at least one seat opens within each four-year
presidential term of office. Such a political balance would facilitate
both sides working to design solutions that may align with diverse
ideologies, thereby increasing confidence in and compliance with
those policies.
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into the process of appointing new governors and public trust in
the institution has dropped to worrisome levels, illustrating how
any institutional design will remain contingent on the decisions of
actors within and outside the institution (Quintyn, 2009).

Public health issues often intersect with key cultural and political
identities. In November 2020, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
v. Cuomo, the court struck down a state order that limited capacity
in churches to 25 people, but made no limits on capacity for even
certain non-essential businesses (2020). Rather than deferring to
an expert agency’s sound discretion, the Supreme Court perceived
that state governors (i.e., partisan politicians) had made invidious
distinctions along religious lines. A standing federal expert agency
may be better able to earn judicial respect as it navigates around
privacy and liberty interests.
Even where fundamental rights are not at stake, for an expert
federal public health agency to have its decisions upheld, the
questions will be (1) whether Congress acted under an enumerated
power, (2) whether the delegation to the agency was legitimate
and well-circumscribed, (3) whether the agency’s action is within
the scope of that delegation, and (4) finally, whether the agency
exercised appropriate procedures (including allowing time for
public comment) in making its decision. With regard to the second
point in particular, Congress may not delegate its core lawmaking
discretion to an independent agency. Thus, it should pass a
statute that gives firm direction to an agency, clearly stating but
circumscribing its authority. If the governing statute does not
provide an intelligible principle, it will violate the non-delegation
doctrine and be struck down, as was discussed by the Supreme
Court in 2001 in Whitman v. American Trucking. The controversial
language in that case pertained to the Environmental Protection
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as to appropriate behaviors and to policymakers as to a united,
and federal, plan of action. As part of the Affordable Care Act,
Congress created the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB)
to recommend cuts to Medicare, which would go into place unless
Congress overruled them by a majority vote. Although IPAB’s
authority was repealed in 2018, it does suggest a model – both of
potential policymaking and political peril.

However, even if the statute is broad (as many organic agency
statutes are), the Supreme Court often interprets them narrowly
to avoid non-delegation problems: For example, in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute (2019), the statute
required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
to create standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate
to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment
... to the extent feasible” (29 U.S.C. § 668). OSHA interpreted the
statute in order to avoid harming American industry. The Supreme
Court found issue with the overly broad language of the statute
but found an intelligible principle that limited OSHA’s power of
interpretation. These cases were about executive agencies, and
the conservative court may be more wary of building a bigger and
less checked government by creating more independent agencies.

We have focused on the CDC as the best candidate for
independence, but arguments could be, and have been, made
for giving the FDA independence as well. In 2019, seven former
commissioners called for the FDA to be converted into an
independent agency (Califf et al., 2020). These calls are compelling,
but the FDA already has robust processes of advisory boards
and public oversight, as well as some budgetary independence
from Congress, given its reliance on user fees, paid by industry.
Moreover, recent years have shown industry actually acting to
buttress the agency against political interference to maintain
public confidence (though one must continue to worry about
industry interference). Ultimately, perhaps some political
accountability is appropriate for the FDA. Choices between faster
and shorter drug approvals are matters of normative tradeoffs as
much as they are technical decisions.
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The CDC and FDA have been very salient during the coronavirus
pandemic. But a different public health crisis, perhaps more like
the industrial accident at Bhopal, India, would highlight the need
to strengthen and protect the independence of other independent
agencies, such as OSHA and the EPA. Frankly, lessons about the
social determinants of health, suggest that just about everything
is public health. Thus an ultimate “public health agency” could
encompass many of the federal government functions.
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Non-delegation is a brewing issue. Wariness over non-delegation
was expressed by Justices Alito and Gorsuch in 2019 in Gundy
v. United States, which held that delegations are permissible
if Congress gives implicit guidelines that agencies can use to
set bounds of authority. The statutory language that the court
interpreted in Gundy was that of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act: “the Attorney General shall have the authority to
specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter
to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter
or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe
rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other
categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with
subsection (b)" (18 U.S.C. § 2250). Justice Kagan found that because
the attorney general was complying with the apparent purpose of
the statute when he applied the requirements to all sex offenders
he did not violate the statute and that because the statute had a
clear apparent purpose that he must comply with the statute was
not overly broad.
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Agency’s (EPA) power under the Clean Air Act to set “ambient air
quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the
judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents
of Section 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health” (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401). In the end,
the Supreme Court rejected the claim that these words were an
unconstitutional delegation of power.

Pr

ep

When Congress considers how to buttress key public health
functions of the federal government, it is not working from a
blank slate. Several federal public health agencies already exist.
For example, the CDC provides health information related to
disease. The problem is that Americans do not often follow the
technical work of agencies, instead they turn to public figures like
Dr. Anthony Fauci, whose role as a leading scientist made him a
trusted source, and helped turn the spotlight on him. Ensuring
that those figures may not be fired at-will should give the agencies
freedom to put out information that may be seen as controversial
but is backed up by science.
At a minimum, one could imagine a limited independent agency
in charge of some of CDC’s current functions, curating health
statistics and making health recommendations, both to the public

COVID-19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE EQUITABLE FUTURE • MARCH 2021 • WWW.COVID19POLICYPLAYBOOK.ORG • 68

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3844058

Recommendations for Action
• Congress should create an independent federal expert agency
whose function, at the very least, is informational and advisory,
for the public and policymakers to rely upon.
• The leadership of this agency should be subject to presidential
nomination with Senate advice and consent.
• Congress should explicitly state expertise as a necessary
qualification for the agency’s leadership.
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• Congress should ensure that commissioners can be fired only
for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”
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• The independent agency’s leadership should be formally
bipartisan.
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• Congress should include in the statute staggered terms for
the agency’s leadership so that each president will typically
nominate at least one commissioner.
• The independent agency’s leadership should be made up of
five to seven commissioners.
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